Chinese betrayal – how India and China Became Mortal Enemies

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Across the 19^th and 20^th Centuries, two of history’s greatest powers/regions took a back seat in global leadership, plagued by colonial conquests and internal power struggles.

Yet as WW2 came to a close, the mighty subcontinent of India declared its independence from the British Empire in 1947. At a similar time in 1949, the Communist Party of China (CPC) established solid control over the country, ushering in an age of Communist China under Mao. As these two major players looked to rebuild their countries and re-enter the world stage, a question would arise: what will the Sino-Indian relationship take shape? Over the course of the next 15 years a series of decisions and events would become the defining story of the Chinese-Indian relationship for decades to come. Here’s how, from the Indian Perspective, A Chinese betrayal became the basis of a near century-long rivalry.

By Mark McKenzie

A New World and Two Emerging Powers

Now two of the world’s largest economies, in 1950 both China and India were far from being economic powerhouses, despite having the largest population’s in the world at the time. Alongside this, there seemed initially no obvious reason for either power to stoke conflict with the other, with many reasons for friendship. Geopolitically, India’s biggest concerns lay with its new neighbour Pakistan following British partition in 1947.

Meanwhile, China’s greatest geopolitical aims lay with its neighbours Japan and Russia, particularly regarding the territory seized by Russia in previous conflicts. Both emerging Asian powerhouses, looking to throw off the shackles of Western colonialism and forge a new path for themselves; what could possibly go wrong?

India’s Overtures of Friendship

Having spent his adult life fighting for independence against Western Imperialists, the first Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was sympathetic both to the Chinese state and communist ideology.

Instinctively, he saw China not as a threat but as a natural partner in building a new post-colonial world order.

The slogan “Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai” (Indians and Chinese are brothers) was pushed by Nehru’s government across the 1950s, and succinctly encapsulates the optimistic spirit of the era. Importantly, words and slogans were not all the Nehru pushed forward with. In 1954, India and China signed the Panchsheel Agreement, establishing five principles of peaceful coexistence that included mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, and non-interference in internal affairs.

Crucially, in 1950 India argued heavily in Communist China’s favour at the UN, stating that the PRC (People’s Republic of China i.e. Maoist China) should replace the sitting ROC (Republic of China in Taiwan), and that Mao’s China should also hold a permanent seat at the UN security Council. This was all alongside broader pushes from India to promote worldwide trade relations with Communist China, solidifying India’s place as one of China’s earliest diplomatic supporters. Nehru was keen to build relationships with strong allies, and the emergent China was an obvious choice – at the time.

Border Disputes & Tibetan Monks

Also in 1950 came the Chinese conquest of the Tibetan region, which India cordially accepted. It’s important to note that despite its location across the vast Himalayan mountains from India, Tibetan culture and history was as much influenced by India as it was by wider China. During the 1950s the situation in Tibet worsened, with armed local resistance in Tibet combating the PLA (People’s Liberation Army – Chinese army), and the Chinese government’s strain on the region caused increasing crackdowns and tensions.

In 1959 pockets of resistance and fighting overflowed into a region-wide resistance, resulting in the 1959 uprising. The Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, swiftly fled across the mountains into India seeking asylum, alongside the majority of his Ministers and many followers. With close cultural links to Tibet, Nehru accepted the Dalai Lama, and the thousands of refugees that joined him, greatly angering the Chinese government, which viewed this act as interference.

Meanwhile, the Indo-Chinese border itself became increasingly contentious. Despite several years of Indian proclamation of its borders, with no dissent or disagreement from China, two areas emerged as particular flashpoints: Aksai Chin in the west, where China had built a strategic road connecting Tibet to Xinjiang through territory India claimed, and the North-East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh) in the east, which China called South Tibet.

You may not be surprised to hear that much of this border dispute stemmed from colonial-era drawing of borders: India insisted on the McMahon Line established during British rule, while China believed these areas to be part of Tibet – a region they considered part of China.

Betrayal: The 1962 Sino-Indian War

“Perhaps there are not many instances in history where one country – that is India – has gone out of her way to be friendly and co-operative with the Chinese Government and people and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and then, for the Chinese Government to return evil for good, even to the extent of committing aggression and invading our sacred land.” – Jawaharlal Nehru, First Prime Minister of Independent India

Unbeknownst to Nehru and India, China had spent many years building roads up to these disputed territories – critical infrastructure required for large troop movement in such mountainous regions. Whilst the Chinese had spent years prior preparing the area for conflict, it was only in 1961 that India began to prepare a defence of its own, with newly installed military posts cropping up all along the border.

It wouldn’t be enough.

For over a year, tensions rose to a boiling point, and in October 1962 China launched its attack. A nation born in civil war, China, against a nation relatively new to large-scale conflict in the modern era. The results were catastrophic for India.

The PLA had carefully built up logistics infrastructure, established a spy network in the region, and carefully positioned its artillery at high-points to quickly eliminate any Indian artillery, leaving the field open for 10,000 PLA soldiers to flood the Namka Chu valley.

India’s Response and a Realignment of Power

Following an initial victory, China pushed their advantage. For over a month from October 20^th to November 21^st, the 1962 Sino-Indian war raged on, with Chinese victory after Chinese victory.

Abruptly despite their victories, on November 21^st the PLA ordered an organised retreat and withdrew behind the line of actual control as of 1959, leaving over 7,000 Indians dead, wounded, or captured and over 2,400 Chinese dead and wounded – a resounding military and political victory for China.

In the short-term, at least.

The reason for China halting its advance is disputed, and ultimately it was likely a mix of multiple factors:

• The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis: It has been speculated that China used the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis as political cover for their offensive. As the crisis ended, China wished not to risk seeing the USSR or USA become involved, and thus withdrew.
• Avoiding Overextension: Much of China’s success came from the unpreparedness of the Indian Army, and as such China wished to take their military and political victory, before its fortunes could be reversed.
• Limited Objective Achieved: China had proved its intended point – they held the military and political advantage, and could (and would) dictate any border negotiations.

China had asserted dominance over the region, and succeeded in its short-term goals. But long-term? It had made a near-permanent enemy of one of the most powerful countries on its borders. Perhaps not the best strategic choice.

India Awakened and Post-1962 Actions

In 1961, India spent roughly 2.07% of its GDP on defence. By 1963, the year after the Sino-Indian war, this had doubled to 4.03%, and maintained at between 3 and 5% for the next 25 years.

Similarly, the Indian military saw dramatic overhaul following their defeat in 1962, expanding personnel and quickly raising six new mountain divisions specifically to counter China’s presence in the Himalayas.

At the end of the war, China controlled roughly 38,000km of the contested Aksai Chin region – roughly 0.4% of its total landmass. And, for its trouble, it had destroyed any serious hopes of long-term alliances with perhaps the next most powerful country in all of Asia.

What’s Next for Chinese-Indian Relations?

The truth is, nobody knows what the future holds. Over the past 60 years Chinese-Indian relations have been punctuated by sporadic but consistent border disputes, occasionally bubbling over into minor military action.

What could have been a powerhouse of Asian collaboration has instead so far been a cautious, occasionally violent relationship between two of the biggest countries and economies in the world.

Yet not all is set in stone – the now “special relationship” between the USA and UK may have once seemed impossible following the American Revolution. China is currently India’s largest trading partner, and it remains to be seen where the relationship stands for 35% of the world’s population.

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